Szemere Bertalan Hungarian Law Enforcement History Scientific Society
Provenance · GPG authentication · publication identifiers
Scholarly citation has two conditions: that the document should bear the responsibility of the publisher, and that it should reach the reader unaltered. The chain of provenance records these two facts: who produced it, where it appeared, and what verification value attests its integrity. This page gives the fingerprint of the GPG key used for the digital signing of the Society's official documents, the assignment of the keys to persons, the steps of verification, and the ISSN, DOI and ISBN identifiers of the publications.
Source data of the page
definition · framework statement, point 4
Provenance (from the Latin provenire — "to originate") is the traceable attestation of the origin, the path of production and the unaltered state of a document or data set.
In scholarly practice provenance is not an assessment of content, but the demonstration that the object cited is indeed what it appears to be. It answers three questions.
The first two layers can also be verified in external registers: the data of the journals are held by the electronic archive of the National Széchényi Library (epa.oszk.hu/02100/02176), the author identifiers by ORCID and the MTMT, and the organisation by the court register. The third layer — integrity — can be traced only if the publisher discloses the means of verification: its key and the checksums. The SZBMRTT undertakes this in point 4 of the scholarly and editorial framework statement:
Point 4 of the framework statement: "the authenticity of the digital publications — where available — can be verified by means of the publisher's publicly disclosed GPG key and the checksum of the document;"
The undertaking contains the qualification "where available", and the qualification is not mere form: not all of the Society's material is signed, and not every public file has a checksum. Section 4 therefore also indicates precisely which value is available on the website today and which is not. This page itself practises what it proclaims: every item of data given here derives from the graph of provenance-bundle.json or from pages of the Society already public.
digital signature of official documents
The key appears in two roles in the Society's data: the graph of provenance-bundle.json assigns it to the person of Dr Parádi József (#paradi-jozsef), while the footer of the website and the President, sections page use the same forty-character fingerprint for the digital signing of the Society's official documents. The two formulations are not contradictory: the graph binds the Society to Dr Parádi József by the founder field, and it is he who signs the documents in the name of the Society.
The fingerprint is the reliable identifier: the name and the e-mail address can be altered in the key bundle at any time, whereas the forty-character fingerprint is computed from the key itself. The Society therefore does not publish it in a single place — it appears in the footer of every page of the website, so that verification does not require a return to this page.
Two routes lead to the key. The Society also publishes the public key on its own website (/assets/keys/paradi-jozsef.asc — the same path is advertised by security.txt), and the key can also be obtained from the keys.openpgp.org key server, by fingerprint (step 1 of section 4). The Society does not use a Web Key Directory. The authenticity of the key is founded not upon the manner of download but upon the reconciliation of the fingerprint: the fingerprint computed from the file and from the key server result must both yield the value 512A 10A6 83CD DAFA A00C BECF 2E08 44B4 6B3A C477.
2 Person nodes in the graph
The graph contains the fingerprint of Parádi Ákos as a forty-character value without grouping (38FC3533D9C172E153F8AE923D4FA3C85863CAC6); the row above returns the same value broken into ten groups of four characters, as GPG displays the fingerprint computed from the key. The e-mail address and UID of the key derive not from the bundle but from the key file published on the website (/assets/keys/paradi-akos.asc): the graph does not contain these two fields. The date of the key's verification on the key server is not known, and the page therefore does not give it — the key can be assessed, in accordance with section 4, solely on the basis of the fingerprint.
key import · fingerprint · signature · checksum
A document can be attested if the place of download is not the evidence, but the key and the checksum are. The five steps below run on the visitor's own machine — the website performs no verification on the visitor's behalf.
gpg --keyserver keys.openpgp.org --recv-keys 512A10A683CDDAFAA00CBECF2E0844B46B3AC477
gpg --import paradi-jozsef.asc
gpg --fingerprint 2E0844B46B3AC477
gpg --verify dokumentum.pdf.sig dokumentum.pdf
sha256sum dokumentum.pdf
The PDFs of the four structured studies are signed. From 16 October 2026, for the seven PDFs belonging to the four structured studies the Society publishes the document's SHA-256 checksum together with its GPG signature (.pdf.asc — a detached, ASCII-armored signature). The signing key is the Society's official key (512A 10A6 83CD DAFA A00C BECF 2E08 44B4 6B3A C477). Steps 3 and 4 can therefore be applied to these files today:
gpg --verify document.pdf.asc document.pdf
sha256sum document.pdf
The public key can be downloaded alongside the PDFs (szbmrtt-signing-key.asc), so that verification can be carried out without an internet connection. The same key is available from the key server by fingerprint. The fingerprint 512A 10A6 83CD DAFA A00C BECF 2E08 44B4 6B3A C477 must match the one published in section 2.
Verification is possible on two levels. For a single document, its own signature sits next to the PDF (.pdf.asc), so downloading that is enough. For the complete archive — all 69 PDFs, 215.6 MB in total — a single signed manifest covers everything: checksums.txt contains the SHA-256 of every file, and the manifest's own signature (checksums.txt.asc) authenticates this single text file. Protection therefore extends to the entire archive while being secured by one signature.
The manifest uses paths relative to the website root, so verification can be run from the root of the downloaded site:
gpg --verify checksums.txt.asc checksums.txt
sha256sum -c checksums.txt
The manifest's own SHA-256: 5ecfa7a9cc96df86dc2ac01a401315e4814438611e4f0eab33a917c9994fea42
| Dokumentum | SHA-256 | Ellenőrzés |
|---|---|---|
| 1-1-botos-janos-a-magyar-kiralyi-belugyminiszterium-helye-szerepe-a-polgari-magyar-allam-rendvedelmi-rendszereben-1867-1945.pdf | fcce13d25ff1a5ed8ac11a10239dfd4fcb2b8cbf593c803e6e64356b087a4215 | .pdf.asc |
| 1-2-botos-jegyzetek.pdf | 9d6cb4c60ea1776373f9ebed1c4f5d0d4eebdc8837d45758ce5d885bbd5ce505 | .pdf.asc |
| 2-1-hegedus-turcsanyi-legideszant-alakulatok-torteneti-elozmenyei.pdf | 3541a59ed1b5d81dbb94a887eeedcc4cbd4eccff198ae4f52b1c74b59814fc04 | .pdf.asc |
| 2-2-hegedus-turcsanyi-jegyzetek.pdf | 34b8a4b6fcfd7763f1fd837d30bab1f3ee5c1204cd51fc084433d994cca67c63 | .pdf.asc |
| 4-1-mezey-barna-a-kora-ujkor-tomloce.pdf | 567cf7d5682eb83a90483f2e02ebf520e4395564d66e39eea83dac631e73c9e8 | .pdf.asc |
| 4-2-mezey-barna-jegyzetek.pdf | f932406838efe1fb8055c77fdbcc5b35f1e1a1139fb1c70cc154bb14b16686f2 | .pdf.asc |
| nagy-akos-peter-a-rendvedelmi-szervek-vedelmi-szolgalata-megalakulasa-es-tevekenysegenek-kialakitasa-a-rendszervaltas-folyamataban.pdf | f8a4c802f06019a441f33fbe241cba460a9909d551a9e293910267a703839e77 | .pdf.asc |
What still cannot be verified. The remaining studies and the publication PDFs are not yet signed, and no checksum is published for the rendered HTML pages (the live page varies per request because of Cloudflare's bot protection layer, which would make a checksum meaningless there). This is the sense in which the qualification "where available" in point 4 of the framework statement is to be understood.
3 ISSN · 2 E-ISSN · 1 DOI prefix · 2 ISBN
The identifiers derive, in unaltered form, from the Periodical, BookSeries and Book nodes of provenance-bundle.json. The graph gives the DOI prefix of the journal (10.31627/RTF) but not the resolved DOI value of any individual item, and this page therefore does not list DOIs. For external reconciliation the graph gives the National Széchényi Library reference of the Acta (epa.oszk.hu/02100/02176).
the three public sources of provenance
Published: 10 October 2026 · Source: assets/json-md/provenance-bundle.json · Key verification: keys.openpgp.org, 5 August 2026 · Publisher: Szemere Bertalan Hungarian Law Enforcement History Scientific Society
