Abstract
Ákos Péter Nagy’s study provides a comprehensive historical analysis of internal integrity oversight within Hungarian law enforcement during the post-regime-change transition period (1989–2010). The author traces the institutional evolution from the Ministry of Interior’s Internal Security Department (Belbiztonsági Osztály) and the ORFK Security Main Directorate through to the establishment of the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies (RSZVSZ) in 1995, culminating in its quasi-dissolution and integration into the National Protective Service (NVSZ) in 2010. The central argument posits that the RSZVSZ was created not merely as an administrative reorganisation but as a necessary structural response to the democratic imperative of maintaining public trust in armed forces operating under public scrutiny. Despite achieving significant international recognition—particularly through mentorship roles in Central and South-Eastern Europe and leadership within the European Partners Against Corruption (EPAC)—the service operated throughout this period within a persistent legislative deficit. Governed primarily by government decrees and ministerial instructions rather than cardinal legislation, the RSZVSZ faced chronic constitutional ambiguities regarding its data-processing powers and operational mandate. The study concludes that while the RSZVSZ successfully established professional ethical standards and international best practices, its long-term efficacy was fundamentally constrained by the failure to enshrine its legal status in a supermajority act, leaving it vulnerable to political expediency and budgetary pressures until its eventual transformation.
Footnote markers [n] follow the numbering of the original (1–78).
Key concepts (Kulcsfogalmak)
Key concepts of the study in Hungarian–English mapping:
| Hungarian term | English equivalent | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Internal Integrity Protection / Internal Affairs Oversight | Belső integritás-védelem | Not merely ‘internal security’ (belbiztonság), which carries authoritarian connotations in the Hungarian context, but a rule-of-law concept denoting proactive prevention and detection of corruption and misconduct within law enforcement agencies to preserve institutional legitimacy. |
| Rule-of-Law Transition / Democratic Consolidation | Jogállami átmenet | The protracted process (1989–2010) of transforming authoritarian internal control mechanisms into democratically accountable oversight institutions, characterised by legislative inertia and constitutional ambiguities. |
| Legislative Deficit / Absence of Cardinal Legislation | Sarkalatos törvény hiánya | The persistent failure to regulate the RSZVSZ’s mandate through a supermajority (two-thirds) parliamentary act, resulting in governance via subordinate legislation (government decrees, ministerial instructions) vulnerable to constitutional challenge and political interference. |
| Maintenance of Public Trust / Institutional Legitimacy | Közbizalom fenntartása | The foundational rationale for establishing an independent integrity oversight body separate from the hierarchical command structure; public confidence in armed forces operating under democratic scrutiny was deemed contingent upon credible internal accountability mechanisms. |
| Organisational Independence / Hierarchical Separation | Szervezeti függetlenség | The deliberate placement of the RSZVSZ outside the direct chain of command of the police and other law enforcement bodies it oversaw, ensuring functional autonomy and preventing conflicts of interest inherent in self-investigation. |
| International Mentorship / Capacity-Building Assistance | Nemzetközi mentorálás | The RSZVSZ’s recognised role in supporting the establishment of analogous integrity services in Central and South-Eastern European states, reflecting its adoption of European best practices despite domestic legislative shortcomings. |
| Constitutional Concerns / Data-Protection Incompatibility | Alkotmányossági aggályok | Persistent legal ambiguities regarding the RSZVSZ’s secret information-gathering powers and data-processing regime, repeatedly flagged by the Constitutional Court and the Data Protection Commissioner as incompatible with fundamental rights guarantees. |
| Professional Ethos / Ethical Paradigm Shift | Szakmai ethosz | The conscious cultivation of an integrity-based professional identity within the RSZVSZ personnel, representing a deliberate break from the loyalty-based nomenklatura culture of the preceding regime and aligning with European policing values. |
From the end of the Second World War until the political and social regime changes in Central and Eastern Europe in 1989–90, Hungary formed part of the Soviet sphere of influence pursuant to the agreements between the Great Powers. A measure of détente was provided by the series of Helsinki conferences, the Final Act of which (1975) – building upon the principles of the UN Charter and enshrining respect for human rights – also marked the zenith of the process of détente between the two world blocs.1 As a consequence of setbacks and renewed Cold War conflicts, the crisis in the Soviet sphere afflicted the societies of Poland, Hungary, the GDR, Romania, and the Soviet Union with daily problems of subsistence, economics, military affairs, and politics, which ultimately led, through desperate reforms, to the strengthening of opposition movements and the dissolution of the Soviet bloc (1985–1991). These events resulted in the triumph of independence aspirations in Central and Eastern Europe.2
Negotiations in these states brought about the dismantling of the Iron Curtain, free elections, and the free formation of rule-of-law institutions. The fall of the Berlin Wall and the reunification of Germany signified the definitive conclusion of the Second World War. During the tenure of the transitional government of Miklós NÉMETH, the Constitution of the Hungarian People’s Republic was amended – effectively in every section – and adopted by the National Assembly in the autumn of 1989, prior to the free elections. The political regime change of 1989–90 entailed a profound transformation of society and the reorganisation of democratic frameworks, marking a return to the conditions of bourgeois democracy. On 23 October 1989, Mátyás SZŰRÖS, provisional President of the Republic, proclaimed the Republic of Hungary, founded on democratic principles.3
A milestone in the process of regime change was the ‘Duna-gate’ affair at the end of 1989, which effectively exploded the existing state security structure, as the state security and law enforcement bodies of the RÁKOSI and KÁDÁR regimes had operated on a dictatorial basis, solely according to secret internal orders and instructions known only to insiders, in a manner alien to the spirit of the rule of law. Following the outbreak of the scandal, an act was passed4 providing for the transitional regulation of the authorisation of special intelligence tools and methods, followed shortly thereafter by a parliamentary resolution concerning the activities of the Ministry of Interior’s Internal Security Service.5
From Dictatorship to Rule of Law
In the protracted process of separating the branches of power and establishing constitutional control, various measures affecting professional fields were enacted, including government decrees, basic laws, and transitional legislation. In this context, the operation of the Ministry of Interior was also placed upon a rule-of-law footing, which entailed the separation of ministerial, state security, and police competences. Of particular note among these are the Government Decree of 1994 on the Tasks and Competences of the Minister of Interior, and the Police Act of 1994.6
The relevant government decree7 assigned specific tasks to the Minister of Interior regarding the internal crime-prevention oversight of law enforcement organisations. To achieve this, work commenced within the Ministry of Interior in the early 1990s to establish the legislative prerequisites indispensable for the execution of this mandate.8 Parallel to the elaboration of the legislative background by the Ministry of Interior, consultations were initiated with co-ministries (Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Justice), since – unlike its predecessor, the Security Main Directorate operating within the ORFK – the intended organisation was designed, ex lege, to extend internal crime-prevention oversight and crime detection beyond organisations subordinate solely to the Ministry of Interior.9
The government led by Dr. József ANTALL, and subsequently that of Dr. Péter BOROS, was succeeded following the 1994 elections by the government of Gyula HORN. In December 1994, after extensive consultation with co-ministries, the draft concerning the future Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies (hereinafter: the Service) was submitted to Dr. Balázs HORVÁTH, Minister of Interior, who later presented it – with significant amendments – to the government in February 1995.
The emerging rule-of-law framework necessitated a shift in mindset among personnel, as well as training, retraining, and further education. Alignment with the civic value system accompanying the regime change, and the incorporation of European norms, also rendered structural and organisational changes imperative.
At the time the draft was submitted to the government, internal crime-prevention oversight of the Police, Border Guards, Fire Service, and Civil Defence was being conducted by the Security Main Directorate, established within the framework of the National Police Headquarters (ORFK) and operating under the direct subordination of the Chief Constable since 1990 as a specialised criminal service. The activities of this Main Directorate extended not only to the aforementioned units but also to all administrative units of the Ministry of Interior and its background institutions.
This structure evolved during the regime change process following the separation of the Police from the Ministry of Interior and the transfer of the BM Internal Inspection Service into the organisational structure of the ORFK. At that juncture, in early 1991, the BM Internal Inspection Service was subordinated to the Police; however, certain managerial prerogatives were retained by the Minister, given that “the internal crime-prevention oversight activity extended to the apparatus of the Ministry itself, as well as, by joint decision with the Ministers of Justice and Finance, to the Penitentiary Corps and the Customs and Financial Guard.”10
Owing to the absence of adequate legislation, it was not yet possible to establish an organisation outside the Police structure possessing appropriate competences. However, the enactment and parliamentary adoption of the Police Act of 1994 resolved the previously lacking fundamental statutory background requisite for the creation of decrees and instructions.
The new regulations obliged members of corps whose personnel composition was nearly identical to that of the former dictatorship’s coercive organs to observe and enforce rule-of-law norms. Concurrently – contrary to popular belief – the establishment of the Service was not predicated upon an increase in offences committed by law enforcement personnel compared to previous years; rather, it stemmed from the fact that members of the armed corps now performed their duties under public scrutiny inherent to democratic foundations, whereby offences committed by personnel threatened the social perception and acceptance of these corps, as well as their operational viability.11
The Preamble to the Police Act of 1994 declares that: “…the National Assembly, in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, its international legal obligations, and the requirements of the rule of law, [established] a Police force functioning accordingly”.12 The Act delineated the multifarious tasks of the Police across ten chapters. Pursuant to the Police Act of 1994, “the Government directs the Police through the Minister of Interior”,13 and the Minister of Interior ensures the oversight of the Police.14 Furthermore, “the Minister of Interior determines the activities of the organisation participating in the direction and supervision of the Police, exercises employer’s rights over its head, and ensures, through this organisation, the internal crime-prevention oversight of the Police and the detection of criminal offences.”15 The Police Act of 1994 also stipulates that “the Government shall ensure, through a controlling body, the internal crime-prevention oversight and crime detection of law enforcement organisations.”16
The imperative of maintaining public trust – essential for the statutorily guaranteed and effective operation of law enforcement organisations – necessitated the creation of a professionally qualified, crime-preventive and crime-detecting organisation endowed with appropriate competences and standing outside the hierarchy of law enforcement bodies.18 Since this activity was assigned by statute to the Government, it was crucial that the newly established organisation should not form part of any armed corps.
Prior to the establishment of the Service, several functional organisational units of the Ministry of Interior and units participating in policing administration actively participated in the supervision and direction of the Police. The leadership of organisations assisting the Minister in his managerial and oversight functions was exercised by a Deputy State Secretary. These organisations conducted internal crime-prevention oversight and crime detection that could only be integrated at the level of management.19
For reasons of guarantee and due to the nature of the task, the operational supervision of the Police, as well as the internal crime-prevention oversight and crime detection of law enforcement organisations, required organisational separation. Given the lack of competence and jurisdiction, the policing administration of the Ministry of Interior could have supervised only those law enforcement organisations subordinate to the Minister of Interior, as well as the operations of the Ministry and its background institutions. Conversely, an organisation situated outside the hierarchy – possessing no dependency relationship with the organisations it oversees – was not subject to such constraints; based on its competence and jurisdiction, it could have conducted crime-prevention oversight of law enforcement organisations directed by other ministries.
Pursuant to the “Authorising Provisions” of the Police Act of 1994,20 the Government was empowered to establish, by decree, such a crime-prevention oversight and crime-detection organisation. Managerial authority vested in the Minister of Interior.21
The “Draft” submitted to the Minister of Interior also addressed the future competences and jurisdiction of the Service to be established. It adequately demarcated the aforementioned tasks from the statutorily defined functions of national security services and investigative authorities, thereby largely precluding conflicts of competence.22
The task definition of the Service was refined: accordingly, the task of the Service was “to establish or exclude reasonable suspicion exclusively concerning criminal offences committed or intended to be committed in an official capacity, as an official person, or in connection with official activity, or military criminal offences, directed towards their prevention, interruption, and detection.”23
Regarding acts committed by personnel of law enforcement organisations but unconnected to their official activities, detection remained the responsibility of general-purpose law enforcement agencies or, where national security competence applied, national security organisations.
The professional discharge of the aforementioned tasks fundamentally required personnel possessing appropriate experience and qualifications who embodied civic values. To facilitate this endeavour, the “Draft” proposed that crime-prevention oversight and crime detection be performed by seconded24 police officers.
Concerning remuneration and operational costs, the authors of the “Draft” concluded that, since the Service was extracted from the Police structure and placed under ministerial subordination, its operational costs must be provided separately from those of the Police. Regarding seconded personnel, the exercise of employer’s rights and the determination of emoluments were to be ensured in accordance with the rules applicable to the ministerial civil service, whilst taking into account the regulations governing police officers in service relationships.25
However, the “Draft” did not address conduct to be adopted in cases of parallel detection involving another law enforcement organisation in the same matter, nor did it specify the anticipated staffing levels of the Service, raising questions regarding expected costs, personal and material expenditures, and the legal status of seconded persons during their secondment.
The completed draft was released for administrative consultation by Gábor KUNCZE, Minister of Interior in the HORN government, with a deadline of 10 February 1995. Based on the comments received, the “Draft” was revised and – as no amendments necessitating further consultation arose – promulgated on 22 March 1995. The submission concerning the Service featured as an agenda item at the government session held on 11 April 1995.
The Government adopted the “Draft” on 4 May 1995, and upon its entry into force, the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies was established on 1 July 1995.26 Thus, unlike its predecessors, the newly established organisation no longer conducted its activities on the basis of secret instructions, orders, or provisional legislation, but operated pursuant to statute and government decree. The government decree concisely formulated the legal status, tasks, activities, and scope of personnel of the Service in merely six points, whilst also referencing the Rules of Procedure containing detailed regulations.27
According to the founding instrument, the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies operates as the legal successor to the Security Main Directorate of the National Police Headquarters under the Ministry of Interior, as an organisational unit of the Ministry of Interior within the territory of the Republic of Hungary, under its direct subordination, and as an independent budgetary organ.28 The leadership and representation of the Service – within the relevant statutory framework – were henceforth exercised independently by a head appointed by the Minister of Interior.
Following the establishment of the Service, to ensure the executability of tasks as prescribed by legislation, the Minister of Interior issued a separate instruction concerning the Rules of Procedure of the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies. Simultaneously, the Rules of Procedure of the Service were prepared as an annex to the instruction.29
The Rules of Procedure addressed the tasks, competences, and jurisdictional area of the Service, its working methods, the order of cooperation and notification, and data processing. It covered the personnel of the Service, its subordination, internal subdivision, direction, and leadership, and concluded with miscellaneous provisions.30
The task of the Service31 – referencing the Police Act – was defined as the internal crime-prevention oversight of law enforcement organisations and the detection of criminal offences. This activity could be conducted within the domain of law enforcement organisations specified32 in the Police Act, with the sole exception of the personnel of municipal fire brigades.33
Its competence extended to the professional, civil servant, and public employee staff of the organisations enumerated in the relevant point of the Police Act of 1994, as well as to conscript and reserve personnel performing service in the Border Guards on the basis of military obligation. Pursuant to the annex to the Rules of Procedure,34 the Service conducts detection in connection with criminal offences committed by this personnel in an official capacity,35 as an official person,36 or at their place of service or in connection with official activity. Exceptions apply to cases which – pursuant to the Police Act – fall within the exclusive competence of national security services or the Police.37
As stipulated in the annex, matters concerning the examination of professional and leadership issues related to the discharge of core tasks by law enforcement organisations do not fall within the remit or competence of the Service.38 Additionally, the Service may implement internal crime-prevention tasks.39 It may not perform procedural acts in criminal proceedings; its detection activities are conducted in accordance with the provisions on secret information gathering set forth in Chapter VII of the Police Act of 1994.40 Detection is pursued until reasonable suspicion is established or excluded. Upon establishment of reasonable suspicion, a report is filed with the competent investigative authority; where conditions for initiating disciplinary proceedings exist, the acquired data are transmitted to the competent superior.41
In enumerating working methods, the annex to the Rules of Procedure details the rights pertaining to the Service’s internal crime-prevention activities,42 the conditions under which the Service is entitled to conduct secret information gathering,43 and the modalities thereof.44 Thus, this chapter lists the law enforcement organisations with which the Service may cooperate; specifies the data to which Service employees may access; and indicates where and when they may enter premises. The chapter on secret information acquisition references the Police Act of 1994, with the proviso that prohibitions are listed exhaustively by title,45 alongside cases authorised by external organisations.46
Chapter III of the annex, entitled “Order of Cooperation and Notification”, enumerates the circumstances under which, when, and whom Service employees must notify, and with whom and in what circumstances they must cooperate.47
Chapter IV of the annex, “Data Processing by the Service”, primarily references Chapter VIII of the Police Act of 1994,48 noting that data specified in the points of the Police Act – particularly data generated through secret information gathering – are processed, and establishes that the Ministry of Interior’s data protection regulations govern the processing of data necessary for operations but unrelated to core activities.49
Chapter V of the annex, “Personnel of the Service”, confirms that core tasks are performed by seconded police officers, to whom the provisions of the Police Service Regulations apply. The second clause of the sentence stipulates that personnel comprise not only professional police officers but also public employees assisting in their work. Regarding employees performing core tasks – i.e., protective duties – the rules applicable to the professional staff of the Police, including the Police Service Regulations, must be applied.50
Chapter VI of the annex stipulates that the Service operates under the direction of the Minister of Interior,51 and its head bears personal responsibility for the Service’s activities. According to the internal subdivision of the Service, it is organisationally divided into a Staff, three departments conducting core activities, and one group fulfilling functional tasks.52 [At that time, the organisational units of the Service – unlike the present structure – were grouped according to protected organisations. There existed a Police (County) Department, an ORFK and Ministerial Organs Department, a Police (BRFK and Pest County RFK) Department, a Border Guard Department, and a Penitentiary Department.] The listing precisely defined the areas of responsibility of the Staff, departments, and the group fulfilling functional tasks.53 Accordingly, the Staff performed secretarial duties, as well as economic, supply, organisational, and inspection tasks falling within the Service’s remit. The 1st Department was responsible for central organisational units and institutions of law enforcement organisations,54 the 2nd Department for territorial organisations of law enforcement organisations in Budapest and Pest County,55 and the 3rd Department for territorial organisations of law enforcement organisations outside Budapest and Pest County responsible for internal crime prevention and crime detection.56 Paragraphs 30–39 detail the tasks of leaders, from the Head of Service down to Deputy Heads of Department.57
The final chapter, Chapter VIII, of the annex to the Rules of Procedure contains miscellaneous provisions, recording guidelines concerning internal cooperation and division of tasks within the Service; furthermore, paragraph 42 provides for personal competence regarding the investigation of complaints arising in connection with the Service’s activities.58
In 1997, Instruction 18/1995 BM was amended by Instruction 15/1997 BM.59 In the draft proposing amendment to Instruction 18/1995 BM, the leadership of the Service, based on legislative changes and experience accumulated during daily operations, submitted several forward-looking proposals. Among these was a proposal to extend liaison to the heads of law enforcement educational institutions and to the heads of organisational units where personnel performing assigned service actually work, as the annex to the prevailing instruction made no provision for these cases.
The leadership of the Service requested a reinterpretation of point I.3.a), as practical experience indicated that it was not always advisable to pass silently over defective professional leadership within law enforcement organisations, since this could seriously damage the social perception and acceptance of the given organisation. In the summer of 1995, the first Head of the Service, Dr. Gyula DEZSŐ – in agreement with his department heads – proposed, alongside numerous other minor amendments, that confidential cooperation agreements be concluded with professional staff members for internal crime-prevention purposes, and further that “...the prospect of refusal or termination of investigation (Section 67 of the Police Act) be applicable with the consent of the prosecutorial investigative authority competent and having jurisdiction in the underlying case”.
The leadership further proposed the subsequent alteration of basic terminology. It was suggested that ‘data collection’ be replaced by ‘information supplementation’, ‘data verification’ by ‘information verification’, and ‘processing’ by ‘secret investigation’. It was proposed to extend the combined time limit for data collection (information supplementation) and processing (secret investigation) from the previous total of nine months to twelve months.
Proposals were also made regarding the organisation of the Service, suggesting that existing departments be redesignated as Main Directorates, whilst subdivisions be elevated to departmental status. Defining the competences of deliberative levels justified the implementation of these proposals.
Regarding the 1st Department (Main Directorate), a proposal was made that its competence henceforth extend, beyond existing units, to personnel serving in ministries directing law enforcement organisations – on the basis of assignment or secondment – as well as to instructors and students belonging to the professional staff of the Police College, concerning crime detection and crime-prevention oversight.
On the subject of personal competence,60 a proposal was submitted to delegate the ordering of information supplementation and secret investigation, as well as their first extension, the application of secret information-gathering tools not requiring judicial authorisation, and the conclusion of confidential cooperation agreements, to the competence of the Head of Department (Head of Main Directorate). The Minister of Interior issued the new instruction amending the Rules of Procedure of the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies on 25 November 1997.61 The amendment largely accepted the proposals contained in the Service leadership’s submission, with several suggested amendments incorporated verbatim into the new Rules of Procedure.
Instruction 18/1995 BM was amended in 33 places, with entire paragraphs altered in several instances,62 or repealed.63 Certain proposals – which, in my view, were professionally highly justified – were not included in the new Rules of Procedure; thus, the Service was not empowered to decide, within its own competence and subject to certain conditions, on the prospect of refusing or terminating an investigation.
Through the transformation of point I.12 and the repeal of points 13–16, the detailed enumeration of the application and possibilities of secret information gathering was entirely removed from the new Rules of Procedure.64 The legal status of the Head of the Service was changed to Director General; departments were redesignated as Main Directorates, and subdivisions as departments. The legal status of leaders of these organisational units changed to Heads of Main Directorates and Heads of Departments.
Ministerial Oversight of the ‘Guardians of the Guardians’
The Minister of Interior established – as an independently functioning main directorate – the Law Enforcement Supervision within the Ministry by instruction.65 The primary task of this Main Directorate was to participate in the ministerial direction and supervision of organisations falling within the scope of the instruction – including the RSZVSZ.66
Gábor KUNCZE, Minister of Interior, formulated the information necessary for management in his ministerial instruction.67 Pursuant to the instruction – supervision and inspection of individual law enforcement organisations, the RSZVSZ, the RTF, and law enforcement secondary schools – were conducted from 1997 by the Law Enforcement Supervision of the Ministry of Interior. Its activities were framed by the Organisational and Operational Regulations of the Ministry of Interior (subsequently: SZMSZ). As one of the primary tasks of the Law Enforcement Supervision, the Minister designated the provision, analysis, and evaluation of information concerning the activities of organisations under his direction and supervision.68
Inspection and supervision, with regard to the provisions of point 2 of the relevant instruction, were conducted by the BM Law Enforcement Supervision through on-site professional inspections,69 the requisition of data arising from the activities of the RSZVSZ, and the reporting of leaders.70 This instruction was repealed by the instruction concerning the reporting order of individual law enforcement organisations, the RSZVSZ, and law enforcement educational institutions to the Ministry, and the coordination tasks of the Ministry.71 According to the new instruction, the Ministry was notified ad hoc of extraordinary events occurring in organisations subordinate to the Ministry, and of the disciplinary situation of personnel and their leaders. By prescribing the obligation to submit domestic and international agreements concluded in accordance with the instruction, the Ministry could form a picture of the relational network of organisations and its impact thereon, whilst simultaneously creating the possibility of fulfilling coordination tasks determined in relation to the BM Law Enforcement Supervision.
The Minister of Interior in the first Orbán government, Dr. Sándor PINTÉR – repealing two previous ministerial instructions –70 introduced a provisional SZMSZ by his new instruction.71 On 21 September 1999, a further BM instruction was issued, assigning specific tasks – among other interior organisations – to the Service as well.72
Thus, pursuant to this instruction, the Service’s five-day reporting obligation persisted, but was henceforth addressed to the Head of the BM Supervision and Inspection Office. The submission was required to contain a national assessment of the disciplinary situation of personnel, cooperation and international agreements affecting core tasks concluded with nationwide organisations, semi-annual and annual work and inspection plans, summary reports on work evaluations, summary reports on financial and economic management, reports on meetings of Service leaders and written submissions, issued normative instruments, and command measures. Additionally, the Head of the Service was obliged to submit, twice yearly (by 31 January and 31 July respectively), a summary report concerning secret information gatherings conducted during the reporting period.73
Furthermore, the Head of the Service was obliged to submit reports on crime-prevention activities concerning the personnel of law enforcement organisations, ongoing detections, and experiences gained from internal crime-prevention and detection work conducted in law enforcement organisations under the direction of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Finance.74
This instruction too met the fate of its predecessors. In 2001, a new ministerial instruction was brought into force,75 which was subsequently – again by a further instruction – amended.76 Pursuant to the new instructions, it was no longer necessary to prepare summary reports twice yearly on secret information gatherings conducted during the reporting period and their results; moreover, submissions were no longer addressed to the Head of the BM Supervision and Inspection Office, but directly to the Minister of Interior.
Overall, in the historical overview of the establishment of the RSZVSZ, “the fundamental change was represented by Government Decree 49/1995 (V.4.), which – through its publication in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Hungary (Magyar Közlöny) and consequent accessibility to all interested parties – regulated the core activity and competence of the organisation in an intelligible manner, both personally and transactionally, and also encompassed applicable methods.”77
During the examined period of the RSZVSZ, the leadership of the Service articulated the following regarding its history: “Our primary strategic objective in the past period was, proceeding from the criminal-operational situation of the protected organisations, to place at the centre of our detection work primarily those infringements which significantly influenced, or could influence, the social perception of the organisation and its lawful, professional, and effective operation. We place great emphasis on detecting those criminal offences and series of offences which have provoked widespread public dissatisfaction with the activities of law enforcement organisations, or which, owing to negative experiences of foreigners visiting our country due to increased tourism, have adversely affected the perception of the nation. We have expanded our crime-prevention activities and have sought more continuous, systematic liaison with commanders and personnel of protected organisations. Our fundamental position is that engagement with personnel is primarily a command function, which cannot be delegated to another organisation.”78
The [n] markers in the body text refer to this note numbering. The author-name abbreviations (GAZDAG, DÜLFFER etc.) are resolved in the file nagy-akos-05-roviditesek.en.md.
Abbreviations in the notes: p. = page · évf. = year of a periodical · sz. = number, issue · ford. = translated by · szerk. = ed./eds. · vö. = cf. · uo. = ibid. (same place) · Loc. cit. = loco citato, in the place cited (Latin)
Notes
1 ↩ GAZDAG; CIBULEVSZKIJ — SANAKOJEV; DÜLFFER.
2 ↩ East Germany’s ‘people’s uprising’ (1956), Hungary’s ‘revolution and war of independence’ (1956), Czechoslovakia’s ‘Prague Spring’ (1968), Poland’s ‘Solidarity’ (1980–1981), the Soviet Union’s ‘Gorbachev reforms’ (1987–1990), Romania’s ‘fall of the Conducător’ (1989).
3 ↩ Act XX of 1949, as amended by Act XXXI of 1989. [1949/XX.tv. az alkotmány 1989/XXXI.tv. általi módosítása.]
4 ↩ Act X of 1991. [1991/X.tv. a különleges titkosszolgálati eszközök és módszerek engedélyezésének átmeneti szabályozásáról.]
5 ↩ Resolution 29/1990 OGY. [29/1990.OGY.hat. a BM belső biztonsági szolgálatának tevékenységéről.]
6 ↩ Government Decree 147/1994, Act XXXIV of 1994. [147/1994.korm.r.; 1994/XXXIV.tv.]
7 ↩ “…the Minister of Interior, within his competence relating to public safety, directs the tasks assigned to the Government concerning the internal crime-prevention oversight and crime detection of law enforcement organisations.” Section 5(1)(e) of Government Decree 147/1994. [147/1994.korm.r. 5.§. 1.bek. e pont.]
8 ↩ Since the task specification also affected the Border Guards, the draft under preparation was presented to the Defence Committee of the National Assembly pursuant to Section 6(3) of Act CX of 1993 on National Defence, and forwarded to the President of the Republic for information pursuant to Section 7(3).
9 ↩ Following tripartite consultations (BM-IM-PM), the BM Security Main Directorate was authorised from 1992 to inspect the personnel of the VPOP and the BV as well.
10 ↩ BM Submission on the RSZVSZ, 1995, p. 2, para. 3. [BM előterjesztés RSZVSZ-ről 1995. 2. oldal 3. bekezdés.]
11 ↩ This purpose was also reflected in the designation ‘Protection Service’.
12 ↩ Preamble to Act XXXIV of 1994. [1994/XXXIV.tv. bevezető szövege.]
13 ↩ Section 4(1) of Act XXXIV of 1994. [1994/XXXIV.tv. 4.§. 1.bek.]
14 ↩ Section 4(1)(f) of Act XXXIV of 1994. [1994/XXXIV.tv. 4.§. 1.bek. f pont.]
15 ↩ Sections 1 and 6, Chapter I of Act XXXIV of 1994. [1994/XXXIV.tv. I.fejezet 1.§. és 6.§.]
16 ↩ Section 94, Chapter X of Act XXXIV of 1994. [1994/XXXIV.tv. X.fejezet 94.§.]
17 Section 97(1)(g), Chapter X (Final Provisions, Interpretative Provisions) of Act XXXIV of 1994 defines ‘law enforcement organ’ as: the Police, the Border Guards, the state organs of Civil Defence, the Professional Fire Service, the organs of the Customs and Financial Guard, and the Penitentiary Corps. [1994/XXXIV.tv. X. fejezet (Záró rendelkezések, Értelmező rendelkezések) 97.§ rendvédelmi szerv...]
18 ↩ Cf. note 10.
19 ↩ Cf. note 16.
20 ↩ Section 100(1)(k), Chapter X of Act XXXIV of 1994. [1994/XXXIV.tv. X.fejezet 100.§. 1.bek. k pont.]
21 ↩ Section 4 of Act XXXIV of 1994; Section 5(1)(e) of Government Decree 147/1994. [1994/XXXIV.tv. 4.§.; 147/1994.korm.r. 5.§. 1.bek. e pont.]
22 ↩ Pursuant to Section 2(1)(g) and (h) of Government Decree 26/1990 MT on the Transitional Regulation of the Performance of National Security Tasks, in cases involving actual members of the Border Guards committing certain military criminal offences (Section 343 of the Criminal Code – escape abroad; Section 352 – mutiny; Section 363 – endangering combat readiness), the National Security Service was competent in 1995 regarding detection and prevention. [26/1990.MT.r. 2.§. (1). bek. g.) és h.) pontja...]
23 ↩ Cf. note 10, p. 4, para. 2.
24 ↩ Pursuant to Section 7(7) of Act XXXIV of 1994, the Minister of Interior is entitled to second police officers for the purpose of performing work or discharging service to the Ministry of Interior or to another law enforcement, state, or local government organ – for a definite or indefinite period. [1994/XXXIV.tv. 7.§. (7). bekezdése...]
25 ↩ Following the adoption of the draft, notification was given to the State Audit Office pursuant to Section 39 of Act XXXVIII of 1992 on Public Finances and Section 20(b) of Government Decree 139/1993.
26 ↩ The first Head of the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies was Colonel of Police Dr. Gyula DEZSŐ. The first Heads of Department were Colonel of Police Ferenc MAKAI, Lieutenant Colonel of Police Géza BEKŐ, and Lieutenant Colonel of Police János LÉVAI. Government Decree 49/1995. [49/1995.korm.r.]
27 ↩ Act XXXIV of 1994; Section 5 of Government Decree 49/1995 on the RSZVSZ; Instruction 18/1995 BM. [1994/XXXIV.tv.; 49/1995.korm.r. RSZVSZ 5.§.; 18/1995.BM.ut.]
28 ↩ BM.I. 6-539/1995, p. 1. [6-539/1995. RSZVSZ alapító okirat.]
29 ↩ Concurrent with the issuance of Instruction 18/1995 BM, Instruction 12/1991 BM and its amending Instruction 25/1992 BM also lost their force.
30 ↩ Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut.]
31 ↩ Annex, point 1, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 1.pont.]
32 ↩ Section 97(1)(g) of Act XXXIV of 1994. [1994/XXXIV.tv. 97.§. 1.bek.g pont.]
33 ↩ Police, Border Guards, state organs of Civil Defence, Professional Fire Service, Customs and Financial Guard.
34 ↩ Annex, Section 3(a), to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 3.bek. a pont.]
35 ↩ Sections 225–228 of Act IV of 1978. [1978/IV.tv. 225-228.§.]
36 ↩ Sections 244, 250, 275 of Act IV of 1978. [1978/IV.tv. 244.§., 250.§., 275.§.]
37 ↩ Sections 156, 261, 343, 352, 363 of Act IV of 1978. [1978/IV.tv. 156.§., 261.§., 343.§., 352.§., 363.§.]
38 ↩ Annex, Section 3(c), to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 3.bek. c pont.]
39 ↩ Annex, Section 4, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 4.bek.]
40 ↩ Annex, Section 5, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 5.bek.]
41 ↩ Only such data may be transmitted to the personnel-competent leader as substantiate disciplinary proceedings and were not acquired through secret information gathering. Annex, Section 6(b), to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 6.bek. b. pont.]
42 ↩ Annex, paragraphs 9–11, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 9-11.bekezdések.]
43 ↩ Annex, Section 12, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 12.bek.]
44 ↩ Annex, paragraphs 13–14, to Instruction 18/1995 BM; cases requiring and not requiring judicial authorisation are also detailed exhaustively (paragraphs 15–16). [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet, 13-14 bekezdések...]
45 ↩ Establishment of cover companies; prospect of refusal or termination of investigation.
46 ↩ Section 68 of Act XXXIV of 1994 on data requests requiring prosecutorial authorisation. [1994/XXXIV.tv. 68.§.]
47 ↩ Cooperation with the Prosecution Service: Annex, Chapter III, Section 17(f), to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet III. fejezet 17. szakasz f.. pont.]
48 ↩ Section 68, Chapter VIII of Act XXXIV of 1994 on data processing by the Police. [1994/XXXIV.tv. 68.§. VIII.fejezet.]
49 ↩ Annex, Chapter IV, Section 20, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet IV.fejezet 20.bek.]
50 ↩ Annex, Chapter V, Sections 22–23, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet V.fejezet 22-23.bek.]
51 ↩ Section 5(1)(d) of Act XXXIV of 1994; Section 5(1)(e) of Government Decree 147/1994; Annex, Chapter VI, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [1994/XXXIV.tv. 5.§. 1.bek.d. pont.; 147/1994.korm.r. 5.§. 1.bek. e. pont.; 18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet VI.fejezet.]
52 ↩ Annex, Section 29, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 29.bek.]
53 ↩ Annex, Chapter VII, Section 29(1)–(3), to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet VII.fejezet 29.bek. 1-3.bek.]
54 ↩ ORFK, HŐOP, Fire and Civil Defence OP, VPOP, BVOP.
55 ↩ Territorial organisations headquartered in Budapest and Pest County.
56 ↩ Territorial organisations of law enforcement bodies outside Budapest and Pest County.
57 ↩ Annex, Sections 30–39, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet 30-39.bek.]
58 ↩ Annex, Chapter VIII, Section 42, to Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. melléklet VIII.fejezet 42.bek.]
59 ↩ Instructions 18/1995 BM and 15/1997 BM; Instruction 2/2000 BM repealed them. [18/1995.BM.ut. és 15/1997.BM.ut. hatályon kívül helyezte a 2/2000.BM.ut.]
60 ↩ Section 30, Chapter VI of Instruction 18/1995 BM. [18/1995.BM.ut. VI.fejezet 30.szakasz.]
61 ↩ Instruction 15/1997 BM. [15/1997.BM.ut.]
62 ↩ For example, point 3/c of the Rules of Procedure was replaced by the following provision: “The examination of professional leadership issues connected to the discharge of core tasks by law enforcement organisations does not fall within the remit of the Service, except where such practice is unlawful or contrary to regulations and preventive measures become necessary.” Instruction 2/2000 BM.
63 ↩ Point 10 of the Rules of Procedure, namely: “For the purpose of obtaining information necessary for the discharge of internal crime-prevention tasks, the Service may not conclude agreements directed towards confidential cooperation with persons belonging to the professional staff of law enforcement organisations.” Instruction 2/2000 BM.
64 ↩ Where suspicion exists of criminal offences specified in the annex to Government Decree 49/1995, the Service conducts secret information gathering as set forth in Chapter VII of Act XXXIV of 1994 for the purpose of substantiating or excluding such suspicion.
65 ↩ Instruction 1/1997 BM. [1/1997.BM.ut.]
66 ↩ Instruction 2/1997 BM. [2/1997.BM.ut.]
67 ↩ Instruction 2/1997 BM, Chapter II, Section 8(a)–(d), particularly: comprehensive examination, thematic examination, targeted inspection, follow-up inspection. [2/1997.BM.ut. II. fejezet 8.bek. a-d. pontok...]
68 ↩ In enumerating cases of ministerial supervision, the RSZVSZ is mentioned in point 3(c), with the proviso that ministerial supervision and professional inspection are personally conducted by the Deputy State Secretary.
69 ↩ Instruction 7/1998 BM. [7/1998.BM.ut.]
70 ↩ Instructions 7/1998 BM; 8/1998 BM. [7/1998.BM.ut.; 8/1998.BM.ut.]
71 ↩ Instruction 22/1998 BM. [22/1998.BM.ut.]
72 ↩ Instruction 31/1999 BM. [31/1999.BM.ut.]
73 ↩ Points 1–5 of Instruction 31/1999 BM. [31/1999.BM.ut. 1-5. pontok.]
74 ↩ Section 6(a)–(b) of Instruction 31/1999 BM. [31/1999.BM.ut. 6.bek. a-b. pontok.]
75 ↩ Instruction 1/2001 BM. [1/2001.BM.ut.]
76 ↩ Instruction 8/2004 BM. [8/2004.BM.ut.]
77 ↩ www.rszvsz.hu/rolunk/tortenet
78 ↩ Loc.cit.
The bold code is the abbreviation used in the notes; it is followed by the full bibliographic entry. Hungarian titles are retained in the original (they are the search keys of Hungarian scholarly literature) with an English translation in square brackets. Latin abbreviations (Loc. cit.) are left untranslated.
Monographs and Short Monographs
DÜLFFER: Jost DÜLFFER: Jalta, 4. Februar 1945 Der Zweite Weltkrieg und die Entstehung der bipolaren Welt. [The Bipolar World Begins at Yalta on 4 February 1945: The Second World War and the Emergence of the Bipolar World.] Hamburg, 1998, Dtv Verlag.
Studies
GAZDAG: Ferenc GAZDAG: ‘Az európai biztonsági és együttműködési konferencia (1973-VI–1975)’ [The Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (June 1973–1975)]. In V. UNAY — GAZDAG (eds.): A helsinki folyamat: Az első húsz év [The Helsinki Process: The First Twenty Years]. Budapest, 1995, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs — Zrínyi Publishing House, pp. 19–36.
Documentary Collection
CIBULEVSZKIJ — SANAKOJEV: B. L. CIBULEVSZKIJ — S. P. SANAKOJEV: Teherán, Jalta, Potsdam. Translated by Edvin ZALAI. Budapest, Kossuth, 1972.
Archives, Files, and Document Collections
BM.I.: Belügyminisztérium Irattára. [Archives of the Ministry of Interior.]
6-539/1995.: 6-539/1995. RSZVSZ alapító okirat. [Founding Instrument of the RSZVSZ.]
Manuscripts
BM előterjesztés RSZVSZ-ről 1995. [BM Submission on the RSZVSZ, 1995.] Submission to the Government on the Decree concerning the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies. Minister of Interior; Budapest, February 1995.
Legislation
1949/XX.tv.: 1949/XX.tv. az alkotmány. [Act XX of 1949: The Constitution.]
1978/IV.tv.: 1978/IV.tv. a büntetőtörvénykönyvről. [Act IV of 1978: The Criminal Code.]
1989/XXXI.tv.: 1989/XXXI.tv. az alkotmány módosításáról. [Act XXXI of 1989: On the Amendment of the Constitution.]
1991/X.tv.: 1991/X.tv. a különleges titkosszolgálati eszközök és módszerek engedélyezésének átmeneti szabályozásáról. [Act X of 1991: On the Transitional Regulation of the Authorisation of Special Intelligence Tools and Methods.]
1992/XXXVIII.tv.: 1992/XXXVIII.tv. az államháztartásról. [Act XXXVIII of 1992: On Public Finances.]
1993/CX.tv.: 1993/CX.tv. a honvédelemről. [Act CX of 1993: On National Defence.]
1994/XXXIV.tv.: 1994/XXXIV.tv. a rendőrségről. [Act XXXIV of 1994: The Police Act.]
29/1990.OGY.hat.: 29/1990 OGY határozat a BM belső biztonsági szolgálatának tevékenységéről. [Resolution 29/1990 OGY: On the Activities of the BM Internal Security Service.]
26/1990.MT.r.: 26/1990 MT rendelet a nemzetbiztonsági feladatok ellátásának átmeneti szabályozásáról. [Government Decree 26/1990 MT: On the Transitional Regulation of the Performance of National Security Tasks.]
139/1993.korm.r.: 139/1993 korm. rendelet az államháztartásról. [Government Decree 139/1993: On Public Finances.]
147/1994.korm.r.: 147/1994 korm. rendelet a belügyminiszter feladat- és hatásköréről. [Government Decree 147/1994: On the Tasks and Competences of the Minister of Interior.]
49/1995.korm.r.: 49/1995 korm. rendelet a Rendvédelmi Szervek Védelmi Szolgálatáról. [Government Decree 49/1995: On the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies.]
12/1991.BM.ut.: 12/1991 BM utasítás az ORFK Biztonsági Főosztály hatásköréről és illetékességéről. [Instruction 12/1991 BM: On the Competence and Jurisdiction of the ORFK Security Main Directorate.]
25/1992.BM.ut.: 25/1992 BM utasítás az ORFK Biztonsági Főosztály ügyrendjéről. [Instruction 25/1992 BM: On the Rules of Procedure of the ORFK Security Main Directorate.]
18/1995.BM.ut.: 18/1995 BM utasítás a Rendvédelmi Szervek Védelmi Szolgálatának ügyrendje. [Instruction 18/1995 BM: Rules of Procedure of the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies.]
1/1997.BM.ut.: 1/1997 BM utasítás a rendvédelmi felügyeletről. [Instruction 1/1997 BM: On Law Enforcement Supervision.]
2/1997.BM.ut.: 2/1997 BM utasítás a Rendvédelmi Felügyelet ügyrendjéről. [Instruction 2/1997 BM: Rules of Procedure of the Law Enforcement Supervision.]
15/1997.BM.ut.: 15/1997 BM utasítás a Rendvédelmi Szervek Védelmi Szolgálata ügyrendjének módosításáról. [Instruction 15/1997 BM: On the Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies.]
7/1998.BM.ut.: 7/1998 BM utasítás az egyes rendvédelmi szervek, az RSZVSZ és a rendvédelmi oktatási intézmények jelentési rendjéről, a minisztérium koordinációs feladatairól. [Instruction 7/1998 BM: On the Reporting Order of Individual Law Enforcement Organisations, the RSZVSZ, and Law Enforcement Educational Institutions, and on the Coordination Tasks of the Ministry.]
8/1998.BM.ut.: 8/1998 BM utasítás a rendőr szakközépiskolák, a pedagógusok és a tanulók jogállásáról. [Instruction 8/1998 BM: On the Legal Status of Police Secondary Schools, Educators, and Students.]
22/1998.BM.ut.: 22/1998 BM utasítás a belügyminisztérium ideiglenes szervezeti és működési szabályzatáról. [Instruction 22/1998 BM: Provisional Organisational and Operational Regulations of the Ministry of Interior.]
31/1999.BM.ut.: 31/1999 BM utasítás a belügyminisztérium alá tartozó rendvédelmi szervek, az RSZVSZ és a rendvédelmi oktatási intézmények jelentési rendjéről, a minisztérium koordinációs feladatairól. [Instruction 31/1999 BM: On the Reporting Order of Law Enforcement Organisations Subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, the RSZVSZ, and Law Enforcement Educational Institutions, and on the Coordination Tasks of the Ministry.]
2/2000.BM.ut.: 2/2000 BM utasítás a Rendvédelmi Szervek Védelmi Szolgálata ügyrendjének módosításáról. [Instruction 2/2000 BM: On the Amendment of the Rules of Procedure of the Service for the Protection of Law Enforcement Agencies.]
1/2001.BM.ut.: 1/2001 BM utasítás a belügyminisztérium alá tartozó rendvédelmi szervek, az RSZVSZ és a rendvédelmi oktatási intézmények jelentési rendjéről, a minisztérium koordinációs feladatairól. [Instruction 1/2001 BM: On the Reporting Order of Law Enforcement Organisations Subordinate to the Ministry of Interior, the RSZVSZ, and Law Enforcement Educational Institutions, and on the Coordination Tasks of the Ministry.]
8/2004.BM.ut.: 8/2004 BM utasítás egyes utasítások és intézkedések hatályon kívül helyezéséről. [Instruction 8/2004 BM: On the Repeal of Certain Instructions and Measures.]
Technical Abbreviations
bek. = bekezdés [paragraph]
OGY. = országgyűlés [National Assembly]
BM = belügyminisztérium [Ministry of Interior]
r. = rendelet [decree]
hat. = határozat [resolution]
tv. = törvény [act]
korm. = kormány [government]
ut. = utasítás [instruction]
MT. = minisztertanács [Council of Ministers]
Latin abbreviations
| Abbreviation | Latin term | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| cf. | confer | compare |
| Idem / Id. | idem | the same (author) |
| op. cit. | opere citato | in the work cited |
| p. | pagina | page |
| i. m. | — | work cited |
| i. h. | — | place cited |
| uo. | — | ibidem |
| vö. | — | compare |
| szerk. | — | edited by |
| ford. | — | translated by |
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